Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - Citizen Suits Provision - Sixty-Day Notice and Delay Requirement by Kaminski, Cheryl
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 29 Number 1 Article 11 
1990 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - Citizen Suits Provision 
- Sixty-Day Notice and Delay Requirement 
Cheryl Kaminski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cheryl Kaminski, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - Citizen Suits Provision - Sixty-Day Notice and 
Delay Requirement, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 187 (1990). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol29/iss1/11 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT-CITIZEN SUITS PRO-
VISION-SIXTY-DAY NOTICE AND DELAY REQUIREMENT-The United
States Supreme Court held that the sixty-day notice and delay re-
quirement of the citizen suits provision of the RCRA is a
mandatory condition precedent for a private citizen bringing suit
under the Act, and failure to comply with these terms requires dis-
missal of the action.
Halistrom v Tillamook County, US -, 110 S Ct 304
(1989).
Section 6972 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (hereinafter, "RCRA") 1 allows individuals to bring suit in dis-
trict court to enforce the waste disposal regulations of the Act.2
Modeled on section 304 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
3
section 6972(b)(1) of RCRA provides that at least sixty days before
commencing suit, the "plaintiffs must notify the alleged violator,
the State, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)," as
1. 90 Stat 2825, as amended, 42 USC .§ 6972 (1982 & Supp V).
2. Hallstrom v Tillamook County, - US -, 110 S Ct 304, 307, 7 L Ed 2d 273,
reh'g denied, 110 S Ct 761 (1989). Section 6972 provides:
Citizen Suits
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence
a civil action on his own behalf-(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United
States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent per-
mitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order
which has become effective pursuant to this chapter; . . .
(b) Actions prohibited
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section-(A)
prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation to-(i) the Admin-
istrator; (ii) the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and (iii) to any alleged
violator of such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
order, except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in
the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of Subchapter III of
this chapter; or (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to
require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order.
In any action under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section in a court of the United
States, any person may intervene as a matter of right.
42 USC § 6972 (1982 & Supp V).
3. 84 Stat 1706, as amended, 42 USC § 7604 (1982).
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the administrator of the Act, of their intent to sue.'
Olaf and Mary Hallstrom (hereinafter, the "Hallstroms") oper-
ate and reside on a commercial dairy farm located next to the Til-
lamook County landfill.' The Hallstroms, in April 1981, sent writ-
ten notice to Tillamook County (hereinafter, the "County") of
their intention to file suit for the 'landfill's alleged violations of
RCRA,6 and, one year later, the Hallstroms filed their complaint.7
On March 1, 1983, the County moved for a summary judgment due
to the failure of the Hallstroms to notify the Oregon Department
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the EPA as required under
RCRA section 6972(b)(1). s The next day, the Hallstroms notified
the agencies of the suit."
The district court denied the motion for summary judgment and
held that the Hallstroms cured any defect in notice by providing
formal written notice to the DEQ and the EPA one day after the
suit was commenced.'" The Court reasoned that this formal notice
allowed the agencies the 60-day time period to cure any violations
occurring at the landfill-and satisfied the purpose of the notice re-
quirement.1" Further, since neither the EPA nor DEQ exhibited
any interest in taking action against the County, the district court
concluded that a dismissal of the action "would waste judicial
4. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 307. Other federal statutes have also incorporated notice
provisions patterned on section 304. For example: Section 505(a)-(b) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat 816, 33 USC § 1365(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp V); section
105(g)(1)-(2) of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 86 Stat 1057,
33 USC § 1415(g)(1)-(2) (1982); section 12(a)-(b) of the Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat
1243, 42 USC § 4911(a)-(b) (1982); section 16(a)-(b) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 88
Stat 2141, 33 USC § 1515(a)-(b) (1982); section 1449(a)-(b) of the Safe Drinking Water Act,
88 Stat 1690, 42 USC § 300j-8(a)-(b) (1982); section 520(a)-(b) of the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat 503, 30 USC § 1270(a)-(b) (1982); section 20(a)-
(b) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 90 Stat 2041, 15 USC § 2619(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp
V); section 310(a)-(d) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 100 Stat 1703, 42 USC § 9659(a)-(d) (1982 & Supp V). Id. Petitioner's Open-
ing Brief (Pet Op Br) at 5-6, Hallstrom v Tillamook County, 110 S Ct 304 (1989) (No 88-
42).
5. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 307.
6. Id. The Hallstroms alleged that contaminated liquid discharged from the landfill
contributed to the pollution of their surface and ground water. Hallstrom v Tillamook
County, 844 F2d 598, 599 (9th Cir 1987).
7. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 307.
8. Id.
9. Id. They also notified the agencies of their intention to refile the suit if the trial
court dismissed the action. Hallstrom, Pet Op Br at 8.
10. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 307.
11. Id at 307-08. A purpose of the notice requirement is to allow State and federal
agencies time to enforce the environmental regulations. Id at 308.
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resources."1 2
After trial, the district court, while denying injunctive relief, de-
termined that Tillamook County had violated RCRA and ordered
the County to cure the violation. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that
"failure to comply with the 60-day notice requirement deprived
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction."14 The court dis-
cussed two approaches to interpreting the notice requirement. One
approach, the pragmatic approach, views the 60-day notice re-
quirement as procedural; therefore, failure to comply with the pro-
vision may be cured with a stay in the proceedings for the 60-day
period.' 5 The second approach, a jurisdictional approach, relies on
the plain language and the policies underlying the statute to make
the notice requirement a mandatory condition precedent to filing a
citizen suit under RCRA.'6 Adopting the jurisdictional view, the
Ninth Circuit held that proceeding without the required notice vi-
olated the plain language of the statute and would constitute a ju-
dicial amendment of a clear statute.17 Further, the Ninth Circuit
indicated that strict construction of the statute would best serve
the goal of giving the environmental agencies the primary responsi-
bility for enforcing RCRA.' 8
12. Id at 308. See Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens v Eaton, 644 F2d 995 (3d Cir
1981), construing the 60-day notice provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Id
at 308, n.2.
13. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 308. The court found that the County had violated and
would continue to violate RCRA and ordered that a plan be formulated to completely and
permanently contain the liquid discharge within the landfill boundaries. Hallstrom, Pet Op
Br at 9.
14. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 308. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a
court over a class of cases to which a particular case belongs or over the nature of the cause
of action and relief sought. Black's Law Dictionary, 767 (West, 5th ed 1979). For example,
when the constitutionality of a federal statute is involved, district court jurisdiction may be
founded on the federal question statute (28 USC § 1331). Section 1331 provides: "[tihe dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 USC § 1331 (1982). In the Hallstrom case, district
court jurisdiction was based on RCRA's citizen suit provision which allowed a private right
of action. Since the procedure of this provision was not followed by the Hallstroms, the
circuit court believed that subject matter jurisdiction was not present. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct
at 308.
15.. Hallstrom, 844 F2d at 600.
16. Id at 600-01.
17. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 308 (quoting Garcia v Cecos Intl., Inc., 761 F2d 76, 78 (1st
Cir 1985)).
18. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 308. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of
the Act and found that citizen enforcement through the courts was to be secondary to ad-
ministrative enforcement, and the notice requirement was to " 'trigger administrative action
to get the relief that [the citizen] might otherwise seek in the courts.' " HaUstrom, 844 F2d
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Justice Pregerson dissented, viewing a requirement that the
Hallstroms refile after dismissal to be excessively formalistic, par-
ticularly since the EPA was actually aware of the conflict and
never indicated any interest in enforcing the statute during the va-
rious stages of the district court action.19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict among the circuits 0 as to whether the notice require-
ment of the citizen suits provision of RCRA is a mandatory condi-
tion precedent to bringing a citizen suit which requires dismissal of
the action for failure to comply with the statute's terms.2' Justice
O'Connor, delivering the opinion of the Court, indicated that the
plain language of the statute prohibited the commencement of ac-
tions before the sixty day notice period to the agencies expired.22
The Court indicated that the subsection title, "Actions prohib-
ited," is expressly incorporated by reference into section 6972(a)
and is, therefore, a mandatory condition precedent to bringing
suit.2" Relying on Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4
the Court refused to adopt the pragmatic approach25 and held that
a waiver of the 60-day notice requirement, through the use of a
court stay, would be the equivalent to a judicially-created excep-
at 601 (quoting 116 Cong Rec 32,927 (1970)).
19. Hallstrom, 844 F2d at 601-02. The Hallstroms also asserted that DEQ had actual
knowledge of the violations occurring at the landfill and had sent several enforcement let-
ters to the County from October 1980 until after the time the Hallstroms notified the agency
of their suit. Hallstrom, Pet Op Br at 7.
20. See notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text.
21. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 308.
22. Id. Section 6972(b) provides:
Actions prohibited (1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of
this section- (A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation
to- (i) the Administrator; (ii) the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and
(iii) to any alleged violator ...
42 USC § 6972(b) (1982 & Supp V). Full text of section 6972 cited in note 2.
23. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 308-09. The Court also believed that the "evenhanded ad-
ministration of the law" would not be served by disregarding the plain language of the sec-
tion. Id at 311 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v Silver, 447 US 807, 826 (1980)).
24. Rule 3 provides: "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." FRCP 3.
25. For cases that have adopted the pragmatic approach, see, Proffitt v Commission-
ers, Bristol Tp., 754 F2d 504 (3d Cir 1985) (construing the notice provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1982)); Hempstead County and Nevada
County Project v EPA, 700 F2d 459 (8th Cir 1983); Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens v
Eaton, 644 F2d 995 (3d Cir 1981) (construing the notice provision in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act); Susquehanna Valley Alliance v Three Mile Island, 619 F2d 231 (3d
Cir 1980), cert denied, 449 US 1096 (1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Cal-
laway, 524 F2d 79 (2nd Cir 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Train, 510
F2d 692 (D C Cir 1975).
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tion to the statute; an exception that Congress had the opportunity
to, but did not, create when it amended the Act in 1984.26
The Justices also indicated that the RCRA notice requirement is
not similar to the statute of limitations provision, as determined
from the language and legislative history, of Title VII actions since
RCRA's requirement is not triggered by the alleged violation.2 7 In-
stead, Justice O'Connor stated that it is "petitioners" who have
control over the timing of the suit.28 Further, the Court indicated
that an interpretation similar to that of section 2000e-5(b) of Title
VII was particularly inappropriate since RCRA actions are filed by
trained lawyers, whereas Title VII claims are generally filed by the
aggrieved individual.2 9
The Hallstroms argued that a strict construction of the notice
provision would defeat the congressional intent in enacting
RCRA.s° However, the Court believed that the Hallstroms' reliance
on the legislative history of section 304 of the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 was misplaced.3 1 The Court, quoting Consumer
Product Safety Comm. v GTE Sylvania, Inc.,3" stated that,
" '[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,'
the words of the statute are conclusive. '33 Justice O'Connor opined
that the legislative history indicates an intent to balance the stat-
ute's purpose of encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental
regulations against the burdening of the federal courts with an ex-
cessive number of citizen suits.3' She concluded that a strict con-
26. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 309. For a congressional exception, see 42 USC §
6972(b)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp V) (removing the 60-day notice requirement when a subchapter
III, Hazardous Waste Management, violation has occurred).
27. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 309. The Hallstroms argued that Zipes v Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 US 385 (1982), should be followed to cause RCRA's 60-day notice provi-
sion to be subject to equitable modification and cure. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 309. In Zipes,
the Court held that the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat 253, as amended, 42 USC § 2000e-5(e) (1982), was not a jurisdictional re-
quirement for bringing suit, but was subject to equitable tolling. Zipes, 455 US at 393-94.
28. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 309.
29. Id at 310.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Hallstroms contended that the primary purpose of the citizen suits provi-
sions of RCRA and other environmental statutes is to protect the environment through the
encouragement of citizen suits when the regulatory agencies have insufficient resources to
act. Thus, allowing the violator the time to remedy the alleged violation and the agencies
the time to enforce the statutes through court action is a subsidiary purpose. Petition for
Cert at 13, Hallstrom v Tillamook County, 110 S Ct 304 (1989) (No 88-42).
32. 447 US 102, 108 (1980).
33. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 310.
34. Id (referring to 116 Cong Rec 32,927 (1970), comments of Senator Muskie and
1990
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struction of the notice requirement would serve this congressional
purpose in two ways .3 First, the notice would allow the Govern-
ment to take primary responsibility for enforcing the regulations
and obviate the need for the citizen suits.3 6 Second, the violator
would have the opportunity to comply with the Act and, likewise,
obviate the need for a citizen suit.
37
The Hallstroms also argued that a literal reading of the provi-
sion in question would cause " 'absurd or futile results '"" since
such an interpretation would allow the violators to cause further
damage and/or would postpone essential temporary injunctive re-
lief until after the sixty days had elapsed.3 9 The Court indicated
that it was not underestimating the potential damage to the envi-
ronment, but that Congress had addressed the dangers of delay in
specific instances by making exceptions to the notice require-
ment.40 Further, the notice provision served to activate the appro-
priate governmental action to prevent serious damage.41 Finally,
the Court maintained that while "procedural anomalies" may re-
sult by not allowing the plaintiffs to bring suit when the agencies
expressly declined to act, such a result was not irrational since al-
lowance of immediate suit ignored the possibility that the violator
or agency may change its mind "as the threat of the suit becomes
more imminent."
4 2
In conclusion, the Court held that the notice and 60-day delay
requirements are mandatory conditions precedent to bringing suit
under the citizen suits provision of RCRA.4 However, the Justices
refused to determine whether section 6972(b) is jurisdictional in
the strict sense of the term.4
4
Note, Notice by Citizen Plaintiffs in Environmental Litigation, 79 Mich L Rev 299, 301-07
(1980) (reviewing the legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970)).
35. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 310.
36. Id (relying on Gwaltney v Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 US 49 (1987)).
37. Id.
38. Id (quoting United States v American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 US 534, 543
(1940)).
39. Id at 311.
40. Id. See for example, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 USC § 7604(b) (1982)
under which citizens may bring suit immediately when stationary-source emissions stan-
dards and other specified compliance orders are involved. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 311.
41. Id.
42. Id (quoting Garcia, 761 F2d at 82).
43. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 311.
44. Id. The Justices could have viewed a failure to comply with the notice requirement
as requiring dismissal regardless of whether the issue was raised by the defendant or that
notice must be alleged in the pleadings. Id at 313, Marshall and Brennan dissenting. See
Garcia v Cecos Intl., Inc., 761 F2d 76 (1st Cir 1985).
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The second issue in the case was whether the failure to comply
with the mandatory notice requirement barred the action and
forced a dismissal of the Hallstroms' claim. "5 The Court relied on
the general rule in Baldwin County Welcome Center v Brown
46
that an action must be dismissed when it is barred by the terms of
the statute. 7 The Court reasoned that dismissal of the RCRA ac-
tion would serve the federal goals set forth in the preceding discus-
sion and would further judicial efficiency by preventing a case-by-
case determination of whether failure to comply with the notice
provision was fatal to a particular action.4 s
The Hallstroms also argued that dismissal would waste judicial
resources since a determination on the merits had been reached.4 9
However, while the Justices were sympathetic to this argument,
the majority noted that the factors which would allow a nonretro-
active decision were not present in this case;5" a new rule of law
was not involved, and no clear precedent had been overruled on
which the Hallstroms may have relied. 1 Instead, the Justices be-
lieved that retroactive application of this decision would further
the congressional purpose of allowing the alleged violators and
agencies a 60-day period to achieve compliance with the RCRA
regulations.2 The Court also stressed that the inequitable result of
depriving the Hallstroms of their day in court would not occur
since they could still give notice and file suit in compliance with
section 6972(b) of RCRA 53 Therefore, the Court held that when a
party sues under the citizen suits provisions of RCRA, but fails to
meet the notice and 60-day delay requirements of section 6972(b),
45. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 311.
46. 466 US 147 (1984). In this case, the Court held that a claimant who failed to file
within the mandatory 90-day time period of a section 2000e-5(f)(1) of a Title VII, 42 USC §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1982), action had forfeited the right to pursue a claim. HaUstrom, 110 S Ct at
311.
47. Id. Contrast Oscar Mayer & Co. v Evans, 441 US 750 (1979), allowing a court to
hold the action in abeyance during the mandatory waiting period of section 14(b) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat 607, 29 USC § 633(b) (1982).
48. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 312.
49. Id. Further, the litigation had been ongoing in the district court for four years. Id.
50. Id. The factors are: (1) Whether the decision subject to retroactive application
establishes a new principle of law through the overruling of a clear past precedent on which
the litigants may have relied or decided "an issue of first impression whose resolution was
not clearly foreshadowed;" (2) whether retroactive operation will further or retard the pur-
pose and effect of the rule at issue; and (3) whether substantial inequitable results would
occur with the retroactive application. Chevron Oil Co. v Huson, 404 US 97, 106-07 (1971).





the district court must dismiss the action since it is barred by the
terms of the statute. 4
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, indicating that the lit-
eral reading of the statute and the dismissal sanction failed to
serve judicial economy and the congressional purposes underlying
RCRA. 5 The Dissent agreed that the statute requires particular
notice before a plaintiff can commence action, and the Hallstroms
did not fulfill that requirement; however, the Dissent believed that
the majority failed to recognize that a connection may not exist
between the violation of the statute and a particular sanction for
noncompliance.5 Relying on Oscar Mayer & Co. v Evans,57 the
Dissent stated that failure to comply with the statutory condition
precedent did not necessarily mandate dismissal of the action. 8
The Dissent reasoned that, while it was arguable that all RCRA
actions are filed by represented parties, the point was that dismis-
sal was not mandated. 9 Further, when sanctions for a violation of
a mandatory condition precedent, i.e, the notice provision of
RCRA, are not specified by the statute, factors extrinsic to the
statutory language must be considered in determining the appro-
priate sanction. 0
The Dissent criticized the Court's analysis that, although the
purposes of the notice requirement would be equally served by a
judicial stay or a dismissal, the broad purposes of the citizen suits
provision would be best served by a dismissal.6 Justices Marshall
and Brennan, however, cited a purpose of the citizen suits provi-
sion to be an encouraging of citizen suits.2 Thus, they reasoned,
since a stay serves the same purpose as a dismissal, a dismissal of
litigation that had been ongoing for four years would be inconsis-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id at 312-13.
57. 441 US 750 (1979).
58. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 313. In Oscar Mayer & Co. v Evans, 441 US 750 (1979),
while the Court held that the 60-day delay requirement was a mandatory condition prece-
dent to bringing suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC § 633(b)
(1982), the Supreme Court allowed the district court to hold the proceeding in abeyance for
the period after commencement of the State proceedings, after which the plaintiff could
continue his federal suit. The Supreme Court recognized that a second filing would only be
a mere procedural technicality and would be inappropriate when the suits are initiated by
unassisted laymen. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 313.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id at 314.
62. Id (referring to S Rep No 91-1196, pp 36-7 (1970), the legislative history of the
identical provision of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 USC § 7604).
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tent with Congress' intent. 3 The Dissent believed this was particu-
larly true in this case since a judicial determination that the
County violated RCRA had already been made. 4
Finally, the dissenting Justices proffered that Baldwin County
Welcome Center,5 relied on by the majority, had no bearing on
the dismissal issue in the Hallstrom case.6 Rather, the Justices
contended that the Baldwin County action had to be dismissed for
the more narrow reason that no complaint had been filed; the
right-to-sue letter was not a complaint for purposes of Rule 3 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Thus, the Dissent con-
cluded, neither the language of section 6972(b), nor the Congres-
sional purposes of fostering private enforcement of RCRA and con-
serving judicial resources compelled the Court's affirmance of the
dismissal rather than fostering a rule that would allow the district
courts to stay such actions.6 8
The notice requirement of the citizen suits provision of RCRA is
virtually identical to at least nine other federal environmental stat-
utes.6 9 In earlier cases, intertwined with the issue of whether the
notice requirement of these citizen suits provisions is a mandatory
condition precedent to bringing suit, was the issue of whether the
savings clause of these environmental statutes would provide a pri-
vate right of action independent of the citizen suits provision. 70 If
so, when the notice requirement was not fulfilled, the action could
continue in district court. Before 1981, absent any directive from
the Supreme Court on the interpretation of these provisions, two
distinct views evolved: the pragmatic view of the Second, Third,
Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits, and the jurisdictional
view of the First, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.71
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Train,72 was one of
the first cases to deal with the notice requirement. Therein, the
Natural Resources Defense Council (hereinafter, "NRDC") argued
63. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 314.
64. Id.
65. 466 US 147 (1984).
66. Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 314.
67. Id.
68. Id at 314-15. In fact, the Justices believed that the two congressional purposes
would be better served by a stay than by dismissal. Id at 315.
69. Cited in note 4.
70. For opposing views, see for example, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v
Train, 510 F2d 692 (D C Cir 1975); City of Highland Park v Train, 519 F2d 681 (7th Cir
1975).
71. Discussed in notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text.
72. 510 F2d 692 (D C Cir 1975).
1990
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that section 1365(e) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)7 3 allowed an action under either the general federal
question statute"' or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 75
when the 60-day notice requirement of the citizen suits provision
of FWPCA was not complied with. 76 Noting that section 1365(e) is
identical to section 304(e) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 77
the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia relied on the legisla-
tive history of the clean air legislation and found, in effect, that
section 1365(e) acted as a savings clause that overcame the juris-
73. 86 Stat 816, 33 USC § 1365 (1982 & Supp V).
74. 28 USC § 1331 (1982). See note 14 for complete text.
75. 5 USC §§ 701-706 (1982). These Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provisions
provide for judicial review of agency action when the person bringing the claim suffered a
legal wrong or was adversely affected within the meaning of a relevant statute. Judicial re-
view is available when a statute provides for such and the agency action is final and another
adequate remedy in a court is unavailable. Also, the agency may itself postpone action
pending judicial review. Id.
In this case, the NRDC argued that the Administrator's failure to promulgate effluent
limitation guidelines as required under the FWPCA allowed it to bring suit under sections
(a) and (b) of the citizen suits provision of FWPCA or the judicial review provisions of the
APA. They argued that the latter was available since section (e) of the citizen suits provi-
sion specifically stated that other statutory remedies were not restricted. NRDC, 510 F2d at
695-99.
76. NRDC, 510 F2d at 699. The pertinent provisions of section 1365, the citizen suit
provision of FWPCA, provide:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section .. any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf- (1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation,
or (2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator .
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section--(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff
has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in
which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order, or (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State
to require compliance . .. , but in any action in a court of the United States any
citizen may intervene as a matter of right. (2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section
prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Adminis-
trator, . . .
(e) Statutory or common law rights not restricted
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent stan-
dard or limitation or to seek any other relief ..
33 USC § 1365 (1982).
77. 84 Stat 1706, as amended, 42 USC § 7604 (1982).
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dictional limitations of subsections (a) and (b). Thus, an action
could be maintained without complying with the notice require-
ments if that action could have been brought without any citizen
suits provision in the statute.78 However, the court indicated that
even though section 1365(b), the notice provision, was not a juris-
dictional prerequisite, the purposes of the notice provision should
still be given effect. Since the purpose of this provision was to ob-
viate the need for judicial recourse by allowing the agencies time to
act on the alleged violation, exhaustion of administrative remedies
was necessary before the action could be maintained. However, if a
court was confident that agency action would be futile, the court
could immediately proceed to the merits without the 60-day time
period being fulfilled. 9
In the same year, City of Highland Park v Train ° was decided
by the Seventh Circuit. In that case, the plaintiffs sought to block
construction of a shopping center, invoking the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970.81 The district court dismissed the claim for failure
to comply with the 60-day notice requirement contained in section
304.82 The Seventh Circuit affirmed stating that, while the legisla-
tive history of the Act indicated Congress' intent to establish citi-
zen participation in the enforcement of the Act, the history also
showed that citizen suits were to be maintained in such a manner
as to avoid overburdening the federal courts and to trigger agency
action which would obviate the need for judicial relief.83 The court
relied on the plain language of the statute to find that the Admin-
istrator must be given notice sixty days before an action may be
commenced. 4 The court discounted the plaintiffs' argument that,
in addition to the citizens suits provision, jurisdiction may also be
78. NRDC, 510 F2d at 701-02. See also, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v
Callaway, 524 F2d 79 (2nd Cir 1975), holding that jurisdiction of alleged violations of
FWPCA can exist under either the general federal question statute or the Administrative
Procedure Act causing section 1365(e) to act as a savings clause when the notice provision is
not complied with; Friends of the Earth v Carey, 535 F2d 165 (2nd Cir 1976), indicating
that the 60-day notice provision under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 was to be con-
strued flexibly and realistically to further its purpose of allowing administrative agencies
time to act on an alleged violation, and that only "informative notice" is required.
79. NRDC, 510 F2d at 703. Justice Robb dissented indicating that the notice provision
was jurisdictional and that the majority read it out of the statute. Id at 730-31.
80. 519 F2d 681 (7th Cir 1975).
81. Id at 683.
82. 84 Stat 1706, as amended, 42 USC § 7604(b) (1982). This section is virtually iden-
tical to section 6972(b) of RCRA and section 1365(b) of FWPCA. See notes 2 and 76.
83. Highland Park, 519 F2d at 690-91.
84. Id at 691.
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based on the general federal question statute and/or the APA. In
so holding, the court stated that since section 304 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 provided an adequate remedy in a court,s" a
new remedy or review under the APA was not necessary. 6 The
Seventh Circuit indicated that the reasons given by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v
Train were inadequate and, instead, held that the savings provi-
sion under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 did not remove the
conditions on the exercise of a citizen's rights to bring suit under
the Act. 7
In Susquehanna Valley Alliance v Three Mile Island,8 8 the
Third Circuit adopted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's view
that, while the 60-day notice requirement of section 1365 of
FWPCA was designed to grant an agency an opportunity to act on
alleged violations of the Act before a citizen's suit, "to require dis-
missal and refiling of premature suits would be excessively formal-
istic."89 The court went on to note that when the district court
acted, the face of the complaint showed that the NRC had notice
of the alleged violation for over sixty days, hence, the district court
had subject matter jurisdiction." Dealing directly with the inde-
pendent private right of action issue, the court indicated that the
savings clause in FWPCA, section 1365(e), gave the district court
jurisdiction independent of the Act under the general federal ques-
85. Section 704 of the APA provides: "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review." 5 USC § 704 (1982) (emphasis added).
86. Highland Park, 519 F2d at 692. The plaintiffs also argued that the remedy of man-
damus under 28 USC section 1361 was also available to compel the Administrator to pro-
mulgate the required regulations under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. The Court,
however, after defining the requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, stated that
the third element, i.e., that no other adequate remedy be available, was not met since sec-
tion 304 provided the remedy to compel the Administrator to perform his duty, and there
was no showing that compliance with the notice provision rendered this section's remedy
inadequate. Id at 691-92.
87. Id at 693. See also City of Evansville, Ind. v Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F2d
1008 (7th Cir 1979) holding that a, failure to comply with the notice requirement of § 1365 of
FWPCA precludes reliance on that section of the Act as a basis for an action, and the sav-
ings provision of section 1365(e), while preserving rights under any statute or common law,
does not, by itself, create a right of action.
88. 619 F2d 231 (3d Cir 1980). In this case, two days before filing their complaint, the
plaintiffs gave notice to the Administrator of the EPA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) of the NRC's alleged violation of FWPCA. Id at 243.
89. Id.




tion statute." In conclusion, the Third Circuit reasoned that reli-
ance on the judge-made rule requiring exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies, when it affects district court jurisdiction, was a
fundamental error: "[wihere, however, Congress has not given any
such clear indication, judge-made rules, such as the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, cannot affect the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district courts, but affect only the timing,
and in some cases the merits of the claim for relief."92
One year later, in Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens v Eaton,93
the Third Circuit specifically adopted the pragmatic view and held
that the notice provision under FWPCA was procedural and fail-
ure to comply with its terms would not void a judgment of a dis-
trict court." Relying on Susquehanna Valley, the Justices stated
that requiring a dismissal and refiling after the sixty-day period
would "waste judicial resources" and frustrate citizen enforcement
of the Act, particularly when the action had reached the appellate
level and eleven months had elapsed from the issuance of the stay
until evidence was heard.9 5
In the same year, the Supreme Court decided Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v Natl. Sea Clammers Assn.9 6 The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants for, among other
reasons, the failure of Sea Clammers to comply with the notice re-
quirements of the citizen suits provisions of section 1365 of
FWPCA and section 1415(g) of the Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA).9 7 The district court also refused to
91. Susquehanna Valley, 619 F2d at 243.
92. Id at 245-46.
93. 644 F2d 995 (3d Cir 1981).
94. Id at 996. In the district court, the defendants had moved for dismissal for failure
of the plaintiffs to give the notice required under section 1365 of FWPCA. The district court
denied the motion but stayed the proceedings until the necessary notice was given. Eleven
months later, a trial was held in which the defendants were found to have violated the Act.
Id.
95. Id at 996-97.
96. 453 US 1 (1981). Sea Clammers sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages, against various governmental entities and officials
from New York, New Jersey, and the Federal Government for alleged violations of FWPCA
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 86 Stat 1057, 33 USC §
1251 et seq (1982), and for nuisance under federal common law. Middlesex, 453 US at 4, 6-7.
97. Id at 6-7. The citizen suits provision of MPRSA provides:
(g) Civil suits by private persons
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may com-
mence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person .. .who is alleged to be in
violation of any [provision or issuance] under this subchapter .... (2) No action may
be commenced-(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given to
1990
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allow Sea Clammers to proceed with a claim which was indepen-
dent of either Act.98 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that failure to comply with the citizen suits notice provi-
sions did not preclude independent suits under the savings clauses
aside from the citizen suits authorized by the Acts. 9 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether FWPCA and MPRSA
implied private rights of action independent of their citizen suits
provisions. 00 In reaching the conclusion that Congress did not im-
plicitly authorize rights of action based on FWPCA and MPRSA
violations which were not grounded in the citizen suits provisions
of the Acts, the Court stated, "[tihese citizen-suit provisions au-
thorize private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these stat-
utes. Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must comply with
specified procedures ... including in most cases 60 days' prior no-
tice to potential defendants."'0 1 Thus, while ending the conflict as
to whether or not private rights of action independent of the citi-
zen suits provisions in the environmental statutes were authorized
by Congress, the Supreme Court's suggestion that the notice re-
quirements of these same provisions were mandatory did not end
the disagreements between the circuits on this issue.'0 2
In Proffitt v Commissioners, Bristol Tp.,' 0 3 the Third Circuit
continued with its view that failure to notify the EPA, the DER
and the defendants sixty days before filing the complaint, as re-
quired by FWPCA and RCRA, did not deprive the district court of
subject matter jurisdiction.10 Without discussing Middlesex, the
court indicated that the purpose of the notice provision was to ob-
viate the need for judicial recourse by spurring administrative en-
forcement or voluntary compliance by the violator.'05 Further, the
the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of the [provision or
issuance]; ....
86 Stat 1075, 33 USC § 1415(g)(1)-(2)(A) (1982).
98. Middlesex, 453 US at 7. The independent claims would have been under the sav-
ings clause provisions of the FWPCA and the MPRSA and based on the general federal
question statute (as in Susquehanna Valley). Id.
99. Id at 8-9.
100. Id at 10-11.
101. Id at 14.
102. The noted allusion could have been viewed as dictum since the specific issue in
Middlesex was whether a private right of action independent of the citizen suit provisions of
the Acts was implied and not whether the notice requirement was procedural or jurisdic-
tional. Also, the quoted language, i.e., "specified procedures," suggests the notice require-
ment is procedural. Hallstrom, Pet Op Br at 33.
103. 754 F2d 504 (3d Cir 1985).




legislative intent to treat citizens as "welcome participants in the
vindication of environmental interests" ' could only be met
through flexible application of the notice provision."0 7 Thus, no-
tice-in-fact was sufficient. 108 .
In the same year, the First and Sixth Circuits specifically relied
on Middlesex to find the notice requirements of the citizen suits
provisions of FWPCA and RCRA to be mandatory jurisdictional
prerequisites to bringing suit under the Acts. The Sixth Circuit
case, Walls v Waste Resource Corp.,0 9 involved a class action suit
under FWPCA and RCRA against the owner, operators and users
of a landfill.110 The district court had dismissed the action for fail-
ure to plead actual notice.' Relying on the plain language of the
statutes and the legislative histories, the Sixth Circuit agreed." 2
The court interpreted congressional intent to indicate that private
lawsuits are to be supplemental to agency enforcement; such suits
tend to harden bargaining positions allowing the Administrator
less room to maneuver.1 3 Further, the court reasoned that dispute
resolution by the EPA would reduce costly private litigation and
allow uniform interpretations of the environmental statutes to be
developed by the EPA. 1 4 In response to the argument that con-
structive notice would serve the same purpose as actual notice, the
court concluded, "[a] plaintiff has the burden of distinctly and af-
firmatively pleading. the facts forming the basis of subject matter
jurisdiction. [Citations omitted.] Mere allegations that the [State],
the EPA and the private defendants have been on notice for a pe-
riod of time exceeding sixty days, and that 'further notice would be
meaningless' fail to sufficiently set forth the jurisdictional predi-
cate of actual notice."'1 5 However, instead of dismissing the com-
plaint, the court indicated that it would allow the plaintiff to file
an amended complaint alleging that actual notice was given to the
106. Id (quoting Friends of the Earth v Carey, 535 F2d 165, 172 (2nd Cir 1976)).
107. Proffitt, 754 F2d at 506.
108. Id. In this case, the county health department had reported the alleged violations
to the EPA and DER in 1980, and the plaintiff had, on several occasions in 1983, met with
EPA and DER officials to discuss environmental problems occurring at the township's sew-
erage plant. Id.
109. 761 F2d 311 (6th Cir 1985).
110. Id at 314.
111. Id.
112. Id at 316.
113. Id at 317 (citing S Rep No 92-414, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 81 (1972), reprinted in 1972
US Code Cong & Ad News 3668, 3745; 1976 US Code Cong & Ad News 6238, 6307).




State, the EPA and the alleged violator at least sixty days
earlier. 16
In Garcia v Cecos Intl., Inc.," 7 the plaintiffs filed a civil action
in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico to enjoin the construction
and operation of a waste disposal facility.' s The defendants suc-
cessfully petitioned for removal to the Federal District Court of
Puerto Rico, at which time, the plaintiffs amended their complaint
to add alleged violations of RCRA." 9 The First Circuit dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to follow the notice
provision in section 6972 of RCRA.120 The court specifically re-
fused to adopt the view of Pymatuning, and instead held that a
citizen must wait sixty days after actual notice before bringing suit
under section 6972 of RCRA, consistent with First Circuit prece-
dent, Middlesex, legislative history, and public policy.' 2 ' The Jus-
tices stated that in view of the Supreme Court's strict interpreta-
tion of private rights of action involving environmental statutes
and its specific mention of FWPCA's notice provision, the identical
requirement under RCRA could not be dismissed as a formality or
procedural provision.122 The court also reasoned that, since there
were at least eight environmental statutes with nearly identical
provisions, the provisions were not meant to be taken lightly. Ad-
ditionally, the policies of allowing the agencies the time to take
action and obviate the need for judicial recourse or for allowing
extrajudicial settlement were not to be ignored. 2 3 Finally, the
court noted that, even if the defendant expressly stated nothing
would be done to remedy the violation, the sixty-day wait before
filing must still be observed in case the parties changed their
minds.'24 The Justices reasoned that after a complaint is filed an
adversarial relationship occurs which makes cooperation less likely.
Thus, a stay in the proceedings or the filing of an amended com-
plaint to cure the defect could not accomplish what dismissal and
116. Id. See also, McGregor v Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F2d 39 (6th Cir
1988), relying on Walls to find RCRA's notice provision a mandatory condition precedent
which must be affirmatively pleaded in the complaint; dismissal with prejudice was man-
dated when plaintiffs were put on notice by defendant's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs
made no effort to amend the complaint.
117. 761 F2d 76 (1st Cir 1985).
118. Id at 78.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id at 80.
122. Id at 81.
123. Id at 81-2.
124. Id at 82.
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refiling would."2 5
Finally, the Hallstrom case came before the Ninth Circuit.
12 6
The court specifically relied on Garcia and remanded to dismiss
and vacate the district court's decision, finding the notice require-
ment to be a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit under
RCRA.1 7 Justice Pregerson wrote a strong dissent finding the no-
tice requirement to be procedural, necessitating a sixty-day wait
only before proceedings on the merits could begin.' He especially
found dismissal and refiling "excessively formalistic" in light of the
fact that the EPA and the DEQ had received written notice of the
action over two years before the trial began.'29
The Supreme Court, in deciding the issue of whether the notice
provision was a mandatory prerequisite to bringing suit, did not
discuss the circuit court cases which dealt with that issue, nor did
the Court rely on the dictum in Middlesex. Instead, the analysis
addressed the arguments advanced by the Hallstroms. However,
the effects of the Supreme Court decision in the Halistrom case
are far-reaching.
By finding the notice and delay requirements of RCRA's citizen
suits provision to be a mandatory condition precedent to bringing
suit, the pragmatic view of the Second, Third, Eighth and District
of Columbia Circuits is, in effect, overruled. 30 Thus, a uniform rule
will develop among the federal circuits. However, in adopting the
jurisdictional approach of the First, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits,' 3 ' the Supreme Court did not decide whether the action had
to be dismissed even if the defendant failed to raise the issue nor
whether notice had to be alleged in the pleadings'32 - the view
maintained in Walls v Waste Resource Corp.133 Therefore, the pos-
sibility exists that the Supreme Court could reconsider its position
if a case comes before it concerning automatic dismissal or the ne-
cessity to plead notice.
Although Justice O'Connor did not specifically state that the
Court's decision applied to the other environmental statutes with
125. Id.
126. Hallstrom v Tillamook County, 844 F2d 598 (9th Cir 1987).
127. Id at 601.
128. Id at 602.
129. Id at 601-02.
130. See notes 15 and 71 and accompanying text.
131. See notes 16 and 71 and accompanying text.
132. See note 44 and accompanying text.
133. Discussed in notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
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similar notice and delay requirements,3 the repeated discussion of
such statutes by the Court and the parties involved makes it likely
that these requirements in the other statutes will also be consid-
ered mandatory condition precedents. 13  Based on this premise,
several problems with the decision become apparent. Since the
Hallstrom case was dismissed for failure to comply with the sixty-
day notice requirement, other cases which fail to meet such re-
quirements will also be dismissed, regardless of whether or not
RCRA is involved. The effect of these dismissals, if the number of
such cases is large and the parties decide to refile their complaint
after dismissal, will be the feared overburdening of the courts - one
repeatedly cited purpose of the citizen suits provisions."3 ' Second,
a number of parties who bring suit under the citizen suits provi-
sions may lack the resources to refile and reargue their case after
dismissal, 137 possibly allowing a violation to continue unchecked.
Thus, the purpose of encouraging citizen enforcement of environ-
mental regulations 38 will not be carried out.
In conclusion, while the Supreme Court decision can cause a uni-
form rule throughout the federal circuits that the notice and delay
requirements of citizen suits provisions under federal environmen-
tal regulations are mandatory condition precedents, the dismissal
of the Halistrom case may cause several of the underlying pur-
poses of the citizen suits provisions to be hindered.
Cheryl Kaminski
134. See for example, note 4.
135. Such reasoning was specifically adopted by the First Circuit in Garcia v Cecos
Intl., Inc. See note 122 and accompanying text.
136. See note 34 and accompanying text. See also, City of Highland Park v Train, 519
F2d 681 (7th Cir 1975) (purpose of the notice requirement of section 304 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 is to avoid overburdening the federal courts).
137. For example, the Hallstroms had spent $95,000 in attorney and expert witness
fees at the district court level. Hallstrom, Pet Op Br at 9.
138. See note 34 and accompanying text. See also, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v Natl. Sea Clammers Assn., 453 US 1 (1981); Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens v Eaton,
644 F2d 995 (3d Cir 1981); City of Highland Park v Train, 519 F2d 681 (7th Cir 1975).
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